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War Tax Refusal: Some Code Problems
William Louis Tabac*
A FTER SEVERAL YEARS OF REFUSING to pay his poll taxes to the Com-
monwealth of Massachusetts as a protest against the Mexican War,
Thoreau was arrested and confined for a night to the jail in Concord. A
friend, probably Emerson, paid Thoreau's delinquent taxes and got him
released the next day. That concluded Thoreau's famous act of con-
science. The paradigm of civil disobedience, as one writer has called it,'
had a profound effect on Thoreau and many who have since considered
his classic, Civil Disobedience; but it had absolutely no effect upon those
who waged the Mexican War. By comparison, Ghandi's experience with
tax refusal was significantly different. As history demonstrates, Ghandi
was able to work it into a revolution that drove the British from India.
Throughout our history, many individuals and groups have em-
ployed tax refusal to make their points. The Boston Tea Party, for ex-
ample, was a protest against taxes, not tea; and dissident Quakers have
occasionally joined together to stop paying taxes as an objection to war.
Yet despite Ghandi's success, a protest based on tax refusal has never
won a significant number of adherents in this country. There are several
reasons for this, but the most pervasive seem to be the fear most people
have of going to jail and the confusion that exists in their minds about
the limits of the power of the Internal Revenue Service (I.R.S.), that is,
what this agency can and cannot do to people who do not pay their taxes.
Until some of their doubts are answered, the antiwar masses will con-
tinue to cling to their placards and keep close step in the peace marches,
while the IndoChina war rages around them.
Yet frustration with government policies and cynicism about the
leaders who create them are driving more and more Americans toward
radical forms of dissent. People are less willing to believe that the most
effective way to reach Washington is through the U. S. Post Office or by
taking to the streets to sing out their protests. Civil disobedience is on
the increase and struggling for status among protestors. So far attacks
against the "establishment," its mores and property, have alternated be-
tween passive law breaking, such as tax and draft refusal, to the in-
creasingly commonplace destruction of that which the protestor detests.
But the mix is not equal, and this is demonstrated dramatically in the
case of tax refusal. Although the number of bomb threats and actual
bombings is up significantly over figures for previous years,2 the number
*Asst. Prof. of Law, Cleveland State University College of Law.
1 Bedau, Civil Disobedience: Theory and Practice 120-121 (1969).
2 According to the Treasury Department, 4500 terrorist bombings occurred between
January 1, 1969 and April 1, 1970. Friedman, Guerilla Warfare Seen in U.S., The
Cleveland Press, Sept. 10, 1970, § C, p. 6, col. 1.
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of tax refusers 3 -those people who are not paying some portion of their
excise and income taxes as their protest against IndoChina policy-
heralds a movement that one observer 4 claims is becoming a fashionable
one, a status that terrorism could never hope to achieve.
Principled Tax Refusal
Until the 1940's tax protest was largely a matter of individual con-
science. Pacifists who had refused historically to drop bombs on people
concluded that they could not logically buy the bombs to let others drop
them; through tax refusal these pacifists tried to divorce themselves from
all complicity with the war-making effort. In 1947, out of the War Re-
sister's League, a traditional pacifists group, emerged the Peacemaker
Movement, a tax refusing pacifist organization. About 250 persons met
in Chicago that year and formed the Movement, which had at that time
the sole purpose of resisting the payment of taxes used for military pur-
poses. Today, aside from the Handbook on Nonpayment of War Taxes
it publishes, the Peacemakers gather news about all aspects of the pro-
test movement for the Peacemaker, a periodical it publishes once every
three weeks.
The Peacemaker is also beginning to serve another function which
its creators probably did not foresee for it. Recently, through a device
known as an "alternative fund," tax and draft refusers have joined to-
gether for mutual support. These alternative funds, consisting of monies
that represent the amount of taxes refused by participants in the funds,
are being used for two purposes: to publicize tax and draft refusal; and
to provide financial support to refusers who, because of their protest,
either cannot obtain employment or do not wish to obtain it. The Peace-
maker will serve as a clearinghouse so that individual alternative fund
groups may learn about others and what they are doing, and about tax
and draft refusers who may be in search of a fund.
Many peace groups followed the lead of the Peacemakers and began
propagandizing tax refusal as a viable protest. Only a small number of
people, however, actually began practicing this form of civil disobedi-
ence. Several reasons existed then, as they do now, for the reluctance
of the masses to stop paying their taxes; and, as suggested earlier, the
most important of them is the fear people harbor of going to jail. An-
other reason why war tax refusal has not challenged the masses is, no
doubt, the pervasiveness of the federal tax lien which guarantees that if
3 A figure that is difficult to determine. The Peacemaker Movement, the chief war
tax refusing organization, claims that the number of telephone excise tax refusers
alone approaches 18,000. Peacemaker Movement, Nonpayment of War Taxes 47 (3rd
rev. ed. 1967). A more recent estimate placed the number of excise tax refusers at
100,000. The Peacemaker, Jan. 16, 1971, p. 5. In 1968, a group called "Writers and
Editors War Tax Protest" obtained over 400 signatures in support of tax refusal.
N. Y. Times, Jan. 31, 1968, p. 40.




the taxpayer has assets and does not conceal them the government will,
if it wishes, collect its tax. The Handbook deals with these concerns,
making Thoreau's argument that tax refusal is justified simply for the
sake of one's conscience, for even if the government will always collect
the tax the significance of the protest is found in the fact that the refuser
is not paying it. The Handbook deals less adequately, however, with the
question that most affects the potential tax refuser, namely, "What will
the government do to my life?" The only hard lesson the Handbook
teaches about this is that one cannot predict what the government will
do, a realization that could very well drive borderline tax refusers back
to their banners and peace marches.
The withholding system has also worked to inhibit the tax refusal
movement. A variation of the federal tax lien, the withholding system
collects income taxes before they are due. At the dawn of the tax re-
fusal movement, clergymen swelled the ranks of tax protestors and
could, as clergymen, avoid the withholding of taxes. 5 By comparison,
most taxpayers are subject to the withholding tax on wages that Con-
gress enacted during the Second World War to guarantee a ready supply
of dollars for the war effort. Consequently, serious protestors who have
taxes withheld can either urge their employers to stop withholding the
tax-which means that their employers would, should they agree to this,
subject themselves to severe criminal and civil penalties6-or quit their
jobs and try to earn withholding free income or too little income to be
taxed.7 Even peace groups, until recently, were reluctant to stop with-
holding taxes from the wages of employees who wished to refuse them,
and many individuals chose to give up their jobs, often with extreme
hardship, so they could continue their protest. Of course, most pro-
testors were, and still are, unwilling to do that. Instead, they compro-
mise their protest by not paying either the telephone excise tax, what-
ever tax that remains to be paid at tax filing time, or both.
5 The withholding tax is collected from wages paid by an employer. Remuneration
paid for services performed by ministers in the exercise of their ministry is not wages
for withholding purposes. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 3401 (a) (9).
6 As in the case of individual taxpayers, the Code provides both civil and criminal
penalties against persons required to collect, account for, and pay over the taxes.
See Yudkin, Corporate Officers in Increasing Numbers Face Penalties for Defaults
on Withholding Tax, 18 J. Taxation 248 (1963). Employers are subject to a 100%
civil penalty for failure to pay over the tax, or for attempts to evade or defeat it.
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6672. The Code provides criminal penalties for failures to
collect and pay over the tax, Int. Rev. Code, supra n. 5 at § 7202, a felony, and to
comply with special deposit provisions contained in Code § 7512. Int. Rev. Code,
supra n. 5 at § 7215, a misdemeanor. If the employer does not withhold the tax and
the employee pays it, the employer is subject to all the penalties described above but
not for the amount of the tax. Int. Rev. Code supra n. 5 at § 3402(d).
7 Not a very likely alternative, however, according to Milton Mayer, a tax refuser
of long standing: "No, the trouble with earning less than [a taxable income] is that
it doesn't support a family. Not a big family like mine. If I were a subsistence
farmer I might get by, but I'm a city boy." Mayer, The Tribute Money, in Civil
Disobedience: Theory and Practice, supra n. 1, at 132-133.
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Notwithstanding the fear, the federal tax lien and the withholding
system, the tax refusal movement has grown. The government has, to be
sure, obligingly provided the targets. The telephone excise tax, created
by Congress to help pay for the Korean War, is strictly a war tax.s The
recently expired income tax surcharge, enacted at the same time that
the telephone excise tax was extended, was also a war tax.9
Borrowing from Thoreau, who objected not to the idea of taxation
but to a particular tax,'0 the Peacemaker urges its followers to practice
"principled" tax refusal, that is to refuse to pay war taxes but not to
attempt to destroy the tax gathering system. In practice, however, prin-
cipled war tax refusal has proved to be an amorphous concept, showing
as many variations as there have been responses by the government to
the challenge of war tax refusal. These variations do, however, gen-
erally derive from a rule that springs from the Peacemaker's concern for
making war tax refusal a moral protest and from their disinterest, a
fortunate one, in taking on the tax gathering system. Surprising as it
may seem, by practicing principled tax refusal, a war tax protestor could
8 Under the Excise Tax Reduction Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 136 (1965), 26 U.S.C. § 4251
(1965), the excise tax on telephone service, enacted to help finance the Korean War,
was scheduled to be reduced from 10% to 3% on January 1, 1966, and to be com-
pletely repealed by January 1, 1969. In the Tax Adjustment Act of 1966, 80 Stat. 38
(1966), 26 U.S.C. § 4251 (1966), however, Congress extended the telephone excise tax
at the 10% rate until April 1, 1968, when the scheduled reductions were to begin.
In the Revenue and Expenditures Control Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 251 (1968) Congress
again, for the 12th time, extended the excise tax on telephone service so that the
10% rate would continue until Jan. 1, 1971. In 1969, Congress again postponed the
reduction in this tax until Jan. 1, 1972. Tax Reform Act of 1969, 83 Stat. 487 (1969);
See remarks of Senators Griffen and Hartke during debate on the Revenue and Ex-
penditures Control Act of 1968, 114 Cong. Rec. 7532-7533, 8125 (1968). And, on De-
cember 31, 1970, President Nixon approved P.L. 91-614, which extends the 10% rate
through 1972, all because of the spiraling deficit brought on by the IndoChina War.
The effects of the excise tax extensions did not go unnoticed. For the fiscal year
ending June 30, 1969, total excise tax collections reached $15.5 billion, up $1.2 billion
over the previous year. 1969 was the first year that excise tax revenues exceeded the
1965 high; excise tax revenues for the intervening years had been reduced by the
Excise Tax Reduction Act of 1965, according to the Commissioner. 1969 Comm'r. Int.
Rev. Ann. Rep. 10. The total amount of excise taxes collected for fiscal year 1970 was
even higher: $15.9 billion. Taxes on Parade, Commerce Clearing House, Vol. 58,
Part I, No. 5.
9 In 1968, Congress added § 51 to the Code which imposed a 10% surcharge on ad-
justed individual income taxes for the period April 1, 1968, through June 30, 1969.
Revenue and Expenditure Control Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 251 (1968). In 1969, Congress
extended the surcharge to January 1, 1970. Unemployment Taxes, Revision-Surtax,
Extension, 83 Stat. 91 (1969). For calendar year 1968, the effective surcharge rate on
adjusted individual income taxes was 7.5%; for calendar year 1969, it was 5% of the
adjusted tax. The Tax Reform Act continued the surcharge to June 30, 1970, at a
5% annual rate for individuals, or a calendar year effective rate of 2.5%. For ex-
pressions of the war tax nature of the income tax surcharge, see Statement of 10
Congressmen, 114 Cong. Rec. 15510 (1968). For the fiscal year ending June 30, 1969,
collections of income taxes both individual and corporate reached an all time high
of $135.8 billion due, in large part, to the income tax surcharge. 1969 Comm'r. Int.
Rev. Ann. Rep. 10.
30 Through tax refusal, Thoreau wished to "trace the effects of [his] allegiance."
Thoreau, Civil Disobedience 43 (1948). By refusing to pay the poll tax he "quiet[ly]
declare[d] war with the state," though he "never declined paying the highway tax"




escape all but one of the Code's civil penalties and all of the Code's
criminal penalties. To do this, he must file an accurate return and not
pay the tax. Even if he refuses to cooperate with the government by
filing no return at all, he still may not be violating any of the Code's
criminal provisions. His liability for civil penalties, however, will be
increased.
Code Penalties, Civil and Criminal
The tax protest of the late Abraham Muste, a prominent pacifist,
illustrates some aspects of principled tax refusal and how they fit into
the Code. Muste did not file returns, or pay taxes for a four-year period,
1948-1952. Instead, he sent a letter each year to the I.R.S. explaining his
position of tax refusal, and suggesting that he would be happy to meet
at any time with its agents to explain his position to them. Since it had
no returns, the I.R.S. sent its agents to Muste's employer, the Fellow-
ship of Reconciliation, an anti-war group, to reconstruct his income for
the period in question. In 1961, the Commissioner assessed deficiencies
against Muste, which included penalties for failure to file" and the 50%
penalty for tax fraud.12 Muste challenged these deficiencies in the tax
court, asserting that the provisions of the tax law which required that
he file a return and pay the tax were unconstitutional as applied to him
because they interfered with his free exercise of religion under the First
Amendment. The tax court rejected Muste's First Amendment claim
and upheld the Commissioner on the failure to file penalty but rejected
the Commissioner's determination that Muste had committed tax fraud
for the years in question. 13 Concluding that the essence of fraud is con-
cealment with intent to deprive the government of the tax, the court
held that Muste's conduct was not fraudulent because he did not try to
conceal the fact that he had income.14 The court was not only impressed
by the sincerity of Muste's pacifist views, but also by the fact that Muste
fully cooperated with I.R.S. agents as he said he would do in the letters
he submitted in lieu of his tax returns. The court held, however, that
Muste's failure to file did not result from reasonable cause, which would
have defeated the failure to file penalty. Rather, applying a reasonable
man standard, the court concluded that Muste's failure to file arose from
willful neglect because he had not consulted an attorney to confirm his
11 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 2 (supp. M), § 291 (a), 53 Stat. 1 [now Int. Rev. Code
of 1954, § 6651(a)].
12 Id. at ch. 2 (supp. M), § 293(b), 53 Stat. 1 [now Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6653 (a)
& (b)].
1" Abraham J. Muste, 35 T.C. 913 (1961).
14 See Jones v. Commissioner, 259 F. 2d 300 (5th Cir. 1958); held: 50% fraud penalty
cannot be sustained against taxpayer who does not file and pay, but elects to use the
money for pressing business neds, even though he knows he owes taxes.
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belief about the unconstitutionality of the filing provisions. Although
Muste was sincere in his belief against war and hence could not harbor
the bad faith or sinister motive that would make him liable for tax fraud,
the court held that his basis for refusing to file was unreasonable, and
consequently, the failure to fie penalty could be assessed against him.
Civil penalties, like those asserted against Muste, have been con-
tinued in the 1954 Code. 15 Ad valorem in nature and assessed as part of
the tax, these penalties cannot exist if there is no tax liability. In con-
trast to the criminal penalties in the Code which serve to punish, the
civil penalties have a remedial function which derives from the nature
of our self-assessment system of taxation. Under this system, each tax-
payer must determine his own income taxes. When the taxpayer does
not do this, the Commissioner must determine his taxes for him; the
civil penalties compensate the Commissioner for performing this func-
tion and help preserve the national purse.16 The amount of the penalty
is added to the deficiency, generally the amount of tax the taxpayer
failed to report.17 To illustrate the civil penalties and their rationale, if
an individual tries to defraud the government, or does not file a return,
or overlooks the law in preparing one, the government will not know
how much tax the taxpayer actually owes and it must expend man-
power, that is, dollars, to determine how much he failed to report.
Until 1969, the Code provided for interest at a modest 6 per cent
rate on the deficiency from the time it was due or on the amount of tax
15 Ad valorem civil penalties pertaining to income taxes include: (1) the 50% addi-
tion for civil fraud, Int. Rev. Code, supra n. 5 at § 6653 (b); (2) the 5% addition for
negligence or for intentional disregard of rules and regulations, Int. Rev. Code, supra
n. 5 at § 6653 (a); (3) the 5% addition each month, up to a maximum 25% of the tax,
for failure to file without reasonable cause a timely return. Int. Rev. Code, supra
n. 5 at § 6651 (a) (1); and (4) the 5% addition each month, up to 25% of the tax, for
failure to pay, without good cause, the amount of tax shown in the return. Int. Rev.
Code, supra n. 5 at § 6651(a) (2). Unlike prior law, the 1954 Code prohibits the assess-
ment of the negligence or failure to file penalties where the civil fraud penalty is
imposed. 10 Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation § 55.01.
16 Since civil penalties are remedial in nature and benefit the Commissioner, Con-
gress provided that one of the Commissioner's functions is to determine whether the
taxpayer is subject to civil penalties, and their amount. As in Muste's case, the tax-
payer may petition the tax court for review of the Commissioner's determination be-
fore he is required to pay them. Int. Rev. Code, supra n. 5 at § 6651; Granquist v.
Hackleman, 264 F. 2d 9 (9th Cir. 1959); 10 Mertens, Law of Federal Income Tax-
ation, § 49.128.
17 "A deficiency is . . . an amount of tax due representing the difference between
the amount returned by the taxpayer and the amount which, in fact and law, is due
the government." 9 Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation, § 49.129; Granquist v.
Hackleman, supra n. 16. Of particular interest to war tax refusers is the fact that
a deficiency may also arise where the taxpayer files an accurate return, disclosing
the amount of tax he legally owes, and says in a letter accompanying the return that
only part of the tax shown is due to the government. The deficiency, upon which
the civil penalties will be assessed, will then be the difference between what the tax-
payer recognizes he owes and what he admits he owes. Repetti v. Jamison, 131 F.
Supp. 626 (9th Cir.), aff'd, 239 F. 2d 901 (1956); Penn Mutual Indemnity Co., 32 T.C.




reported as due by the taxpayer on his return but not paid.'8 Under the
Tax Reform Act,19 enacted by Congress in 1969, a late payment penalty
was added. It provides that a taxpayer must pay an additional one-half
per cent per month for each month that he refuses, without good cause,
to pay the income tax shown as due on his return. The late payment
penalty therefore raises the effective rate of interest to 12 per cent per
year in cases where a protestor refuses to pay his income taxes.
The principled tax refuser, in the Peacemaker sense, can therefore
escape all civil penalties, except the late payment penalty, if he files an
accurate income tax return, but refuses to pay the tax and waits for the
government to collect it. By comparison, the tax refuser who wishes to
concentrate exclusively on the excise tax charged for his telephone
service and refuse to pay that escapes all of the Code's civil penalties,
including the late payment penalty, because no tax returns are involved:
the telephone excise tax is assessed by the government and not by the
taxpayer. Consequently, the excise tax refuser's only cost will be the
6 per cent interest Congress charges for the use of the government's
money.
The government did not prosecute Muste for his protest, a decision
that was probably made for tactical reasons, to be discussed later. In
any event, Muste's failure to file his tax returns by April 15th, because
of strong convictions against war and military spending, no matter how
sincere those convictions were, subjected him to a possible $10,000 fine
and a year in jail for each year that he did not file a return.
While the civil penalties contained in the Code serve to compensate
the I.R.S. for the dollars it must expend to determine and collect the
amount a taxpayer owes, the criminal penalties serve to coerce the tax-
payer to comply with the requirements of the self-assessment system.
Code criminal penalties are arranged in a hierarchical scheme capstoned
by the inclusive tax fraud felony, defined to consist of "willful at-
tempt [s] . . . to evade or defeat any tax . .. or the payment thereof." 20
Principled tax refusers would not be subject to a charge of tax fraud,
however, because they do not intend to defraud and they do not attempt
to defraud, the elements the government must prove to establish this
crime.2 1 Because the U. S. Supreme Court has defined "attempt" to
mean an affirmative act of some kind,22 passive failures to fie a return
when one is due or to pay the tax on time, though willful, are not at-
tempts to evade or defeat the tax or its payment within the meaning of
18 Int. Rev. Code, supra n. 5 at § 6601.
19 83 Stat. 487 (1969), amending Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6651.
20 Int. Rev. Code supra n. 5 at § 7201.
21 Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343 (1965).
22 Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492 (1943).
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the felony provision.23 Nevertheless, since "punctuality is important to
the fiscal system," 24 the defaults listed above, along with willful failures
to keep records and to supply information when required make up the
rest of the scheme Congress established to preserve the tax gathering
system. 25 But the punishment prescribed for breach of these provisions
is less severe than that established for tax fraud. Congress made willful
failures to file returns, keep records, supply information or pay the tax
misdemeanors punishable by a fine of $10,000 and possible imprisonment
for up to one year.
The Struggle to Define "Willful" Tax Crimes
Courts have been plagued with some troublesome questions under
the misdemeanor provisions; one that has proved to be particularly
difficult is under what circumstances can a taxpayer be prosecuted for
a non-negligent failure to file a return by April 15th. The controversy
centers on what meaning should be given the statutory term "willful".
All the circuits agree that a taxpayer cannot be prosecuted if he forgets
to file a return. Put carelessness aside, however, and the circuits di-
verge. The Third26 and Fifth Circuits hold27 that the willfulness the gov-
ernment must prove contains these elements: that the accused knew he
was required to file a return and that the accused intended to defraud
the government by not filing one. The accused must intend to "get away
with not paying the tax", as the Third Circuit has said.28 By contrast,
the Second,29 Fourth,30 Seventh, 31 Ninth,32 and Tenth Circuits33 have
held that willfulness under the misdemeanor provision is established
when the government shows that the accused knew that he was required
23 Id. § 7201 establishes two crimes: attempts to evade or defeat (1) the tax or (2)
payment of the tax. Cohen v. United States, 297 F. 2d 760 (9th Cir. 1962) illustrates
the difference between them. In Cohen, the taxpayer filed an accurate return, fully
disclosing his income tax liability. But when the government sought to collect the
tax, the taxpayer concealed his assets, misrepresented his ability to pay the tax, and
transferred some of his assets to avoid collection. The Ninth Circuit held that
although the taxpayer did not attempt to evade or defeat the tax, because he filed
an accurate return, his actions amounted to attempts to evade or defeat its payment.
24 Spies v. United States, supra n. 21, at 496.
25 Int. Rev. Code, supra n. 5 at § 7203.
26 United States v. Citman, 246 F. 2d 206 (3rd Cir. 1957).
27 Jones v. Commissioner, 259 F. 2d 300 (5th Cir. 1958).
28 United States v. Vitiello, 363 F. 2d 240 (3d Cir. 1956); United States v. McGonigal,
214 F. Supp. 621 (D.C. Del. 1963).
29 United States v. Schipani, 362 F. 2d 825 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 934
(1966).
30 Yarborough v. United States, 230 F. 2d 56 (4th Cir. 1956).
31 United States v. Matosky, 421 F. 2d 410 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 904
(1970).
32 Martin v. United States, 317 F. 2d 753 (9th Cir. 1963).




to file a return by April 15th and purposely did not file one then. The
government need not, in other words, prove a specific intent to defraud.
3 4
The split between the circuits over the meaning of "willfulness" in the
failure to file provision arose because of their differing interpretations
of two significant U. S. Supreme Court cases, Murdock v. United States35
and Spies v. United States.36 Taken together, the two cases discuss the
willfulness element in the misdemeanor provision, and more: they illus-
trate a striking difference between what the government must prove to
convict an individual under the failure to file provision and the equally
important failure to pay provision, a difference that has confounded the
courts in their attempts to set standards for conviction under the mis-
demeanor provisions.
In Murdock, petitioner was charged with the misdemeanor of with-
holding information. On appeal he contended that he would have in-
criminated himself under the Fifth Amendment if he had turned over
the information to government officials. The precise question before the
Court was this: Does "willfully" as used in the misdemeanor statute
mean more than voluntary? In concluding that it did, the Court held that
"willfulness" contained an element of "bad motive." Congress, the Court
said, never intended that an individual should be punished criminally
under the tax laws for his mere failure to conform to a standard of con-
duct prescribed in those laws. More specifically, the Court held that
petitioner's "good faith belief" in the lawfulness of his act negated the
bad motive the government must prove to make out the offense. Al-
though the Court concluded that petitioner's good faith belief was a
complete defense to the charge, it waited 10 years before it defined
what it meant by the term "bad motive", the additional element which
the government must prove along with the voluntary nature of the
accused's default to establish willfulness under the misdemeanor pro-
vision. In Spies v. United States,37 the Court held that the bad motive it
mentioned in Murdock simply meant that the government must prove
that the accused was aware of the statutory duty and that he intended
to breach it. But the Court carved out a significant exception to the
government's burden of proof under one of the misdemeanors. In a
prosecution for failure to pay the tax, the Court said, the government
must prove something further-that the accused had an "evil motive"
along with the "bad purpose" it had just defined. Since Spies was the
last Supreme Court case to deal with the willfulness element in the
34 "The only bad purpose or motive required is a deliberate intent not to file when
the defendant knew he should have filed so that the government would not know the
extent of his liability." Yarborough v. United States, supra n. 29, at 61.
35 290 U.S. 389 (1933).
86 317 U.S. 492 (1943).
87 Id.
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misdemeanor provision, it was up to the lower courts to give meaning
to the "evil purpose" which the Court had abandoned to them. And the
few that have dealt with failure to pay prosecutions38 have construed
this "evil motive" to mean a specific intent to defraud, which, for war tax
refusal purposes, lifted this misdemeanor right out of the Code.
In Spies, the Court dealt with some distinctions between the felony
and the misdemeanors. The precise question before the Court was this:
Do two misdemeanors, a failure to file a return and a failure to pay the
tax, taken together, establish the felony, tax fraud? The Court concluded
that they did not, holding, in substance, that two passive acts cannot be
combined to yield the affirmative act required for tax fraud. The sig-
nificance of the case from the tax refuser's viewpoint is in its discussion
of the willful element as a component of the felony and of the mis-
demeanors. The Court drew the following distinctions between the
felony and misdemeanors, and among the misdemeanors themselves:
(1) to establish willfulness in tax fraud cases, the government must
prove that the accused had a specific intent to defraud it; (2) to estab-
lish willfulness in cases where the accused is charged with failing to
measure up to Code prescribed standards of conduct the government
must prove only that the accused was aware of the conduct and that he
intentionally, as opposed to negligently, did not measure up, the "bad
purpose" of Murdock; (3) and, to establish willfulness in a failure to
pay case, the government must prove some element of evil motive be-
cause, as the Court said, "In view of our aversion to imprisonment for
debt, we would not, without a clear congressional intent, assume that
mere knowing and intentional default in payment of a tax, where every-
thing is disclosed, is intended to constitute a criminal offense of any
degree." 39
Spies and Murdock have generated a considerable amount of con-
fusion among the circuits. In their insistence in failure to file cases that
the government must prove that the accused intended to defraud it, the
Third and Fifth Circuits seem to be equating the "bad purpose" element
of Murdock with the "evil motive" element of Spies when the two are
not in the same. In Spies, the Court first defined what it meant in Mur-
dock by "bad purpose," namely, knowledge of the obligation and an
intent to evade it, 40 and then went on to say that an "evil motive" had
to be proved by the government in failure to pay cases. The few courts
38 United States v. Goodman, 190 F. Supp. 847 (N.D. Ill. 1961); Mitchell v. Commis-
sioner, 18 F. 2d 308 (5th Cir. 1941) (wagering tax prosecution); see United States v.
Palermo, 259 F. 2d 872 (3d Cir. 1958); United States v. Fahey, 411 F. 2d 1213 (9th
Cir. 1969); but see, United States v. Magus, 365 F. 2d 1007 (2d Cir. 1966).
39 Spies v. United States, supra n. 35, at 498.
40 In failure to file cases, according to the Court, "mere voluntary and purposeful, as





that have dealt squarely with failure to pay cases, have concluded that
this "evil motive" means a specific intent to defraud, which is what the
government must prove in a prosecution for tax fraud. Perhaps this is
why the Third and Fifth Circuits contend that the willfulness require-
ments for the felony and misdemeanors are identical. Yet the Second,
Seventh, and Ninth Circuits are just as capable of painting with as broad
a brush. While these circuits correctly hold that the government need
only prove the "bad purpose" established in Murdock, as defined in
Spies, to secure a conviction under the failure to file provision, they
appear to have ignored the crucial distinction the Court made in Spies
between the failure to pay crime and the rest of the misdemeanors. By
lumping all the misdemeanors together, these circuits insist that the
willfulness the government must prove to secure a conviction under the
felony is greater than the willfulness it must prove to secure a convic-
tion under the misdemeanors. Unfortunately, the argument among the
circuits over the quality of willfulness that the government must prove
in a failure to file prosecution-and what is certain to develop into a
real imbroglio, what quality of willfulness must the government prove in
a failure to pay prosecution-could plague the courts for some time to
come, for the Supreme Court recently had an opportunity to clarify this
area of the law but turned it down.
41
The failure to pay crime has been part of our tax law for over 40
years,42 yet the government did not win its first conviction under it until
1957.4 3 Binky Palermo, a notorious gambler, not the typical war tax
protestor, to be sure, did not pay his income taxes over a five-year
period, although he paid them before his case came to trial. In the
meantime, he paid money that would have gone for taxes to other
creditors, while maintaining, as the Appellate Court noted, a comfortable
standard of living. On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed his conviction,
suggesting that a taxpayer need not prefer the government as a creditor.
Even though evidence in the record indicated that Palermo sought to
prevent collection of the tax, the court was impressed by the fact that
he eventually paid it, albeit some years later, and held that Palermo
41 In United States v. Matosky, 421 F. 2d 410 (7th Cir. 1970), the Seventh Circuit
expressly rejected the appellant's request for an instruction-and with it, the rea-
soning of the Third and Fifth Circuits-that the "existence of a tax associated motive
-a failure to file [in order that] the government would not know the extent of his
liability" is necessary for conviction under the failure to file provision. Id. at 412.
Citing Murdock, the court held that "defendant's motive need not be restricted to an
intent to defraud the government for § 7203 to be violated," Id. at 413, a correct
statement about § 7203, as far as it goes. The Supreme Court denied cert., 398 U.S.
904 (1970).
42 First appearing in § 1114(a) of the Revenue Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 116, then as § 146
(a) of the Revenue Act of 1928, 45 Stat. 835, § 145 (a) of the Revenue Act of 1936, 49
Stat. 1703, and as § 145 (a) of Int. Rev. Code of 1939, 53 Stat. 62 before becoming
§ 7203 of the 1954 Code.
43 United States v. Palermo, 152 F. Supp. 825 (E.D. Pa. 1957).
11Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1971
20 CLEV. ST. L. R. (2)
did not have the specific intent to evade the tax.44 Similar in result is
Goodman v. United States,45 the last reported decision of a failure to pay
case. Goodman was acquitted because he, like Palermo, did not intend
to evade the tax. To show his wrongful intent, the government proved
that Goodman attempted to prevent it from collecting the tax by using
his money for other purposes and by stalling negotiations to settle his
liability. But the Court considered it important that Goodman, a lawyer,
was in financial difficulty and had trouble paying his bills. In acquitting
Goodman, the court relied upon Spies and its dictum that the case fell
within the shadow of imprisonment for debt, adding, as the Court did in
Palermo, that one need not borrow money to pay his tax, nor is there a
requirement that one must prefer the government as a creditor.
46
The failure-to-pay cases have special significance for the thousands
of people who are not paying the telephone excise tax. They instruct
that the government is virtually powerless to prosecute them for their
protest so long as they do not conceal assets out of which the govern-
ment may collect the tax. If war tax refusers should attempt to conceal
assets, the government could successfully argue that they are trying to
defraud it, and thereby establish the felony. 47 The failure to pay cases
also instruct the war tax refusers who file income tax returns by April
15th that report the amount of tax the government can legally claim.
All non-paying tax protests that do not tamper with the reporting re-
quirements enjoy an equal status under the Code as far as its criminal
provisions go. The only recourse the government has is to collect the
tax under its lien, as its own expense, 48 and charge interest for the use
of its money. Still, the income tax refuser has a significant problem that
the excise tax refuser does not have to face, namely, the withholding
tax. Withholding of income tax on wages could quite likely leave the
income tax protestor without means to refuse war taxes. No doubt
Congress had this in mind when it established the withholding scheme
at the dawn of the country's entry into World War 11. 4 9
44 Palermo v. United States, 259 F. 2d 872 (3d Cir. 1958).
45 190 F. Supp. 847 (N.D. 111. 1961).
46 Id. at 857.
47 Proof that the taxpayer concealed assets to avoid collection will also establish the
specific intent to defraud which the government must prove in a prosecution under
§ 7201 for attempts to defeat payment of the tax. Cohen v. United States, supra n. 22.
One might therefore ask how the government proves the misdemeanors of failing to
file and failing to pay in jurisdictions that require it to prove a specific intent to de-
fraud along with these defaults. As in a tax evasion case, where the attempt itself
is not enough to establish the intent, the government looks to collateral conduct of
the accused, including his tax paying habits for prior years. Emmich v. United
States, 298 F. 5 (6th Cir. 1924), cert. denied, 266 U.S. 608 (1924); United States v.
Gannon, 244 F. 2d 541 (2d Cir. 1957); but see United States v. Long, 257 F. 2d 340
(3d Cir. 1958).
48 Int. Rev. Code, supra n. 5 at § 6332(c) (1).





The withholding system effectively blocks a mass tax protest in two
ways: it affects employees who might wish to refuse taxes and the small
number of employers who might wish to help them. Employees, as the
Code defines them,50 are subject to withholding of income at the source
of their wages. Usually the tax withheld by the employer is sufficient
to equal or closely approximate the amount of tax an individual owes
by tax filing time, but not always. If a husband and wife work, for
example, the amount withheld will not equal their tax, but they will not
usually be so under-withheld that they are confronted with a large tax
bill on April 15. The Peacemakers Handbook suggests several ways to
avoid the withholding vortex. One may become a minister of the gospel,
an independent contractor, hold part-time jobs, falsify the W-4 form,
and so on. But most people, though warm to the idea of war tax refusal,
are not willing to radically change their life style to engage in protest,
just as large numbers of people are not willing to go to jail as a conse-
quence of their protest. In terms of the numbers who would join it,
therefore, the war tax protest movement is corralled by the withholding
system. The government knows this, for it has reacted vigorously
against attempts by war tax refusers to escape it.
The withholding provisions, like the self-assessment system from
which they arise, leave it up to the employee to determine how much
income tax will be withheld. The employee submits a withholding ex-
emption certificate, W-4 form for short, to his employer in which he lists
the number of exemptions he claims, and the employer determines the
amount of tax to be withheld by using tables contained in the Code
geared to the number of exemptions contained in the form.51 The em-
ployer is not responsible for the accuracy of the W-4 form. Realizing
that the more exemptions they claim, the less tax the employer will
withhold, some tax refusers have escaped withholding completely by
claiming more exemptions than the Code allows 52 on the rationale that
the Code, like the government that enforces it, has too narrow a view of
human dependency. These protestors feel that they are responsible for
the financial support of all U. S. troops in Vietnam or the moral support
;0 Int. Rev. Code, supra n. 5 at § 3401 (c).
51 The Handbook contains tables that show how much income an individual may
earn without incurring tax liability. For the period Jan. 1, 1970, to July 1, 1970, a
taxpayer may earn $1725 if he claims himself as his only exemption and another
$625 for each additional exemption he claims. If he claims, for example, three
exemptions he may earn $55.99 tax-free dollars per week or $239.99 tax-free dollars
per month. These figures will increase slightly when the personal exemption in-
creases to $650 on July 1, 1970. Peacemakers, Nonpayment of War Taxes 13-14 (3d
rev. ed. 1967).
52 Int. Rev. Code, supra n. 5 at § 151 which sets forth the categories of personal
exemptions.
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of all the world's peoples and claim these groups as exemptions on their
W4 forms.
Many tax refusers have eschewed this tactic, arguing that falsifying
the W-4 form to claim too many exemptions is not in keeping with
principled tax refusal which holds that nothing is to be concealed
from the government. By contrast, those claiming excessive exemptions
argue that there is nothing inconsistent between filing false W-4 forms
and principled war tax refusal. Obviously frustrated over what the
withholding system does to their protest, these protestors contend that
the matter of withholding is strictly between them and their employer
since the tax is not due to the government until April 15th. Only on
that date, according to their line of reasoning, will they disclose the
correct number of exemptions to the government, if they file a return;
or, if they do not, to Internal Revenue agents who demand such in-
formation. The government can then, if it wishes, enforce its lien and
collect the tax. Meanwhile, this group will avoid prepaying the tax by
whatever means necessary, and that includes by filing W-4 forms that
claim all mankind as family.
Thus, the principled war tax refuser contends that he is avoiding
taxes legally, and not evading them. The distinction is crucial for the
U. S. Supreme Court has recognized that tax avoidance is both popular
and quite permissible.5 3 Unfortunately, the line between evasion and
avoidance is often elusive. While, as just discussed, on the one hand,
the principled tax refuser has no interest in defrauding his government,
on the other, if he falsifies a W4 form to increase his exemptions and
thereby decrease the income tax that is withheld he appears to be
doing just that. Consequently, it is necessary to determine whether an
employee furnishes false information to the government when he
tampers with his W-4 form; and whether, in any event, the giving of
such false information amounts to tax evasion, which is any attempt to
defeat the tax or its payment.
Under the withholding provisions, the employer uses the W4 form
to withhold an amount from the employee's salary that should approxi-
mate the employee's final tax liability on that salary. Under the Code,
however, this final tax liability is determined when the tax is due, on
the date that the employee is required to file the return and assess it.
The employee is not therefore furnishing information to the government
when he files a W-4 form with his employer; nor is he concealing in-
formation from the government when he files a false one. As far as tax
evasion is concerned, the crime requires a specific intent to defraud the
government of a tax that is due, aside from an affirmative act.54 The tax
53 See Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55 (1930).




refuser who files a false W-4 form with his employer would appear to
be outside this definition for two reasons: First, as mentioned above, he
does not intend to defraud the government and second, any income tax
he might owe is not due until April 15th.
In apparent recognition of these principles, Congress has established
a criminal penalty that deals specifically with the falsification of W-4
forms. Section 7205, 55 which applies "in lieu of" any other Code criminal
penalties, makes it a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of $500 and pos-
sible imprisonment for up to one year to tamper with the W-4 form
under the circumstances spelled out in that section.
An interesting argument could be made, which will not be explored
in great detail here, that Section 7205 may not operate in the way that
its drafters intended. The argument rests on the idea that while the
provisions of Section 7205 prohibit an employee from filing false W-4
forms when he is required by Section 3402 to file them, these provisions
do not appear to prohibit an employee from filing false W-4 forms at
any other time. Since, as mentioned above, the employer withholds or
does not withhold on the strength of the W-4 form alone, one may use
the language of these sections to make the argument that an employee
may file a false W-4 form whenever he is not required to file one under
Section 3402 and wipe out withholding for those periods. 56
Section 3402 requires an employee to file a W-4 form only when the
W-4 form "then in effect" claims more exemptions than the employee is
entitled to claim under the Code. To rescue employers from the tremen-
dous amount of bookkeeping that would be required if they were to give
immediate effect to each W-4 form filed with them, Congress provided
in Section 3402 that such forms shall take effect only on specified "status
determination dates," namely, January 1st, May 1st, July 1st, and Oc-
tober 1st of each year. The Code grants the employer the option, how-
ever, to give effect to W-4 forms for the next payment of wages. No
matter which scheme the employer follows, the important consideration
55 "Any individual required to supply information to his employer under section
3402 who wilfully supplies false or fraudulent information, or who wilfully fails to
supply information thereunder which would require an increase in the tax to be
withheld under section 3402, shall, in lieu of any other penalty provided by law . . .
upon conviction thereof, be fined not more than $500, or imprisoned not more than
one year, or both." Int. Rev. Code, supra n. 5 at § 7205.
56 At first blush, subsection (C) of Code § 3402(f) (2) appears to suggest that an em-
ployee must submit a new W-4 form whenever he wishes merely to change the
number of exemptions he will claim for the following calendar year. § 3402(f) (2) (C)
provides that the employee "shall, in such cases and at such times as the Secretary
or his delegate may by regulations prescribe" furnish his employer with a W-4 form
when "the number of withholding exemptions to which the employee will be, or
may reasonably expected to be entitled" at the beginning of his next taxable year is
"different" than the number he presently claims. Int. Rev. Code, supra n. 5 at
§ 3402 (f) (2) (C). By Treas. Reg. § 31.3402 (f) (2) -1(C), (1957), as amended, T. D.
7048 __ Cum. Bull. _. however, the Commissioner has required an employee to fur-
nish a W-4 form to his employer only when his exemptions decrease.
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is that a delay exists between the time a W-4 form is filed with an em-
ployer and the time that it goes into effect. Thus, to take an example
using the effective date scheme, if an employee files a W-4 form on De-
cember 1st that is sufficient, because it overstates his exemptions, to
eliminate withholding of tax, it will take effect on January 1st. On Jan-
uary 1st-actually, within 10 days of that date-the employee is required
under Section 3402 (and Section 7205) to file an accurate W-4 form. But
this form does not serve to restore the amount of tax that should be
withheld until the next status determination date, which is May 1st.
Meeting Tax Refusal Head On
A crucial factor to consider here is of course the likely political re-
sponse to tax refusal. If the loophole just described is utilized by large
numbers of protestors and upheld by the courts, Congress will move
swiftly to close it. In practical effect, putting considerations of principle
aside, any wage earner who takes advantage of the hiatus between Sec-
tions 7205 and 3402 can defeat the withholding scheme. A war-minded
Congress would never permit its most effective tax gathering device to
fall by the wayside.
The Executive Branch is no doubt best equipped to deal with a
broadly based tax protest if one should arise. By adopting a vigorous
enforcement posture, the Department of Justice and the I.R.S. could
chill and destroy any mass movement aimed at avoiding war taxes.
These agencies have in fact quietly begun such a campaign. Last Sep-
tember, the Justice Department successfully prosecuted a war tax re-
fuser for giving false and fraudulent information on his W-4 form.
Shea, the defendant, claimed twenty dependents-fourteen more than
he was entitled to under the Code-and wrote a letter to I.R.S.
explaining his protest.5 7 The trial went very well for the government:
Shea was, apparently, the first person ever convicted under Section 7205
and the judge imposed the maximum sentence. In November, the Justice
Department won its second conviction under Section 7205 against a war
tax refuser, and a third, fourth, and fifth person were recently indicted
under the same provision.55 The I.R.S. has also been busy. An of-
ficial of that agency told this writer that the I.R.S. intends to collect
every delinquent telephone excise account, not a small task by any
measure. According to this official, collections were approximately eight
months behind.
Yet, no matter how much the administration may wish to crack
down on war tax protestors, it still must contend with certain inhibiting
factors built into the self-assessment system itself. The Justice Depart-
57 The Peacemaker, July 18, 1970, p. 1, col. 3.




ment, which stands guard over the self-assessment system, must exercise
extreme care before prosecuting anyone under the Code's criminal pro-
visions for a reason as old as the law itself. Each time an accused is
acquitted, individuals who have been acting as the accused will be en-
couraged to continue and others who were simply contemplating such
conduct will be "invit[ed] to play the game." 59 Likewise, where confu-
sion exists about whether the conduct is unlawful at all, for instance, in
a failure to pay case, the government becomes virtually powerless to try
to prohibit the conduct and it must resort to indirect methods, such a
rigorous collection of delinquent accounts, to deter the threat to the sys-
tem. This no doubt accounts for the fact that the government has not, in
recent years, charged anyone under the failure to pay provision, choosing
instead to prosecute war tax refusers under the more crucial, and as yet
untested, Section 7205 penalty.
From the collection end of it, the I.R.S., which must protect the
national revenue, cannot squander that revenue no matter how con-
fidently it asserts it will collect every delinquent excise tax account.
Eliminating fixed overhead costs, the average cost to the I.R.S. of collect-
ing delinquent accounts by telephone or letter is $22.96;60 of course, the
few war tax refusers who yield to this kind of persuasion will probably
be far outnumbered by the many who, having begun their protest, will
continue it to the end. So, given the relatively small amount of excise
tax assessed against the average telephone subscriber each month and
accepting a recent estimate of excise tax refusers as reliable,6 ' the cost
to the I.R.S. of collecting all delinquent telephone excise accounts is
prohibitive. This is not to suggest that the I.R.S. is about to give up
against the non-paying war tax protestor, for it may resort to some
selective collections to induce compliance. Still, because of the practical
limitations with which the enforcement authorities must contend, it ap-
pears extremely unlikely that any principled protestor will be success-
fully prosecuted for not paying his tax.
59 "Uniformly, it is recognized that the predominant objectives to be secured by
[the conviction] is the necessity of deterring others from committing [tax] fraud
upon the government .... The thoroughness and conservatism of the investigative
and review process is indicated by the fact that around 2 per cent or less of the 100
[full-scale investigations by I.R.S. of tax fraud cases] are brought to trial and acquit-
ted." Address by Commissioner Thrower, American Bar Foundation, February 22,
1970. The overall conviction rate for tax crimes is about 95%. See 1967 Att'y. Gen.
Ann. Rept. 329.
60 Letter from the I.R.S. to Representative Charles H. Vanik, July 10, 1970.
61 About 18,000 according to the Peacemakers. Peacemaker Movement, Nonpayment
of War Taxes 47 (3rd rev. ed. 1967).
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Tax Refusal Today: A Gentle Rebellion
At this stage of their protest, at any rate, war tax refusers do not
seriously believe that they will bankrupt the republic by not paying their
taxes. They have too much respect, on the one hand, for the federal tax
lien, the device that allows the government, when diligent, to collect be-
fore anyone else may collect; on the other, they still stand in fear of
their government for what it may do to them. In the face of these
realizations, many question the value of a protest that ends with the
government getting its due, with interest. Apparently, war tax refusers
in this country would rather consider their protest as an exercise in in-
dividual conscience, more in the tradition of Thoreau than Ghandi.
Many of them are simply refusing to pay a few dollars of income tax or
telephone excise tax and investing them in the alternative funds de-
scribed earlier. According to the Peacemaker, which serves as a clear-
inghouse for news of these funds, alternative funds are being created
throughout the nation.6 2 From the tax protestor's standpoint, they have
something to recommend them. Most important, he is supporting others
who believe as he does. Secondly, management of the alternative funds
is typically handled by unincorporated associations and non-profit cor-
porations, which suggests that if these entities carry out the business for
which they were formed the government would appear to be powerless
to seize their assets for the taxes that their members are not paying.65
Finally, as far as the personal freedom of the members themselves is
concerned, since the courts have indicated that a person may do what he
wishes with his money so long as he does not deliberately prevent the
I.R.S. from collecting the tax, it is unlikely that the government will
be able to convict them, either for tax evasion or under the misdemeanor
provisions.
Yet, the threat of harassment remains; and considering the recent
prosecutions under Section 7205, the government apparently is not will-
ing to ignore the challenge of war tax refusal. Given these factors and
barring a dramatic shift in the economy or in the conduct of the war, the
conventional protests will probably continue to best express the hopes
of the dissident masses.
62 Conscientious Tax Consultants, a non-profit Ohio corporation established by mem-
bers of Clergy and Laymen Concerned About Vietnam, is such an alternative fund
operating locally.
63 Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436 (1963). The term "business,"
for tax purposes, is construed broadly. See generally, 7 Mertens, Law of Federal In-
come Taxation § 38.10.
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